Деловой иностранный язык

Theories of Corporate Governance

The original corporate concept enshrined a philosophical assumption about the nature of man, one that has been reflected in subsequent developments of company law – a view that man is essentially trustworthy, able to act in good faith in the interest of others with integrity and honesty. This is implicit in the fiduciary relationship required of directors. Certainly checks and balances are involved, but only to catch the occasional rogue.

This perspective has been termed stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis 1988) and is consistent with some behavioural theories; for example with theory Y of Macgregor, whose principal propositions include:

1) that management is responsible for organizing the productive elements – men, machines, materials and money – in the interests of economic ends;

2) that people are not by nature passive or resistant to organizational needs;

3) that the motivation, the potential for development, the readiness to direct behaviour towards organizational goals are all present in people.

However, one of the earliest studies in the field of corporate governance, by Berle and Means in 1932

provided a challenge to the conventional assumptions of stewardship theory. They pointed out that] ownership in large public companies had become separated from management. No shareholder owned significant proportion of the equity capital.

The top managers themselves held only very small stakes, if J any. Consequently the shareholders were no longer able to monitor the affairs of the business in which they had invested – they had surrendered their control to management. Moreover, the interests of owners and management was likely to diverge – the former seeking increased corporate worth reflected in share price and dividend stream, the latter in job security, reward packages, and other personal benefits.

Berle and Means contended that managers did not have the same interest and motivation as the owners to make full and efficient use of the corporate assets. Consequently the owners had to introduce other means to ensure an alignment of owners and managers interests. Jensen and Meckling (1976) extended the argument by assessing the agency cost of this alignment.