Английский для военных/Military English. Метод кейсов/Cases. Решения, ответы, словарь, глоссарий

The approach based on operationally maneuvering from the sea could also face stiff opposition, and it would introduce some logistical challenges, but it would also shorten the distances – and potentially the time – that maneuver and WMD-E TFs have to advance to key DPRK nuclear and missile sites in the north.

Finally,

Figure 1.1

might be the fastest way to seize DPRK nuclear sites until the WMD-E TFs arrive, but this approach could leave the assault forces exposed and isolated.

Trade-offs between risks and timelines also exist:

Some risks might be mitigated, for example, by conducting heliborne assault opera-tions against a site only when heavier ground maneuver forces are closing on that site so that assaulting forces can be quickly reinforced.

Question 2

2. Intelligence Requirements.

The quality and reliability of U.S. intelligence will be critical in winnowing the number of sites to be initially assaulted, seized, and secured down to those that will best reduce the risk of WMD being leaked or employed.

For example, poorintelligence can result in forces being sent to seize and secure sites bereft of WMD

Very good intelligence could, in theory, reduce the number of sites requiring coverage, support the efficient allocation of limited resources, and reduce risk. (In practice, however, North Korean efforts to hide weapons and disguise sites may significantly diminish the effectiveness of U.S. and allied intelligence.

)

Twointelligence issues complicate planning for the WMD-E mission.

– First, intelligence gaps will likely mean that critical facilities rumored or reported to exist cannot be located.

– Second, as previously noted, many weapons – particularly CWs – are likely to have been dispersed tonumerous tacticaloperationalsites that cannot be identified in advance and are not included in estimates of a country’s WMD infrastructure.

Answer

For the WMD-E mission in North Korea, even in a DPRK collapse scenario, forces searching for WMD will not know what type of resistance they might encounter.

TFs should consist, therefore, of both WMD specialists and general-purpose forces that are adequate for the potential threat and tactical situation. This could be a significant consideration given the nature of North Korea’s armedforces and the degree to which its population is armed and indoctrinated to fear and distrust U.S.